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Abstract
Arthur Danto’s celebrated declaration of ‘‘the end of art’’
might seem to accommodate well the apparently open-
ended aesthetic diversity of contemporary art. However, in
his philosophy of art history, Danto treats the pursuit of
autonomy as a misdirected philosophical concern, and
denigrates the aesthetic pluralism of contemporary art as
a matter of empty indifference. As a result, Danto not only
fails to do justice to the explosion of artistic forms in recent
decades, he contributes to their misconstrual. Accordingly,
this paper revisits the opposition between autonomy and
pluralism on which Danto’s philosophy of art history rests,
arguing that artistic self-definition ought to be conceived,
not as a misplaced conceptual problem, but rather as a dis-
tinctly aesthetic concern, integral to art practice and criti-
cism. So understood, autonomy and pluralism do not stand
opposed but rather mutually implicate one another, and the
historical responsibility for artists to define the terms of
their own work, rather than having been exhausted, persists
amidst the broad field of formal possibilities presented by
contemporary art’s complication with everyday life.
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In apparent opposition to the modernist pursuit of
autonomy, contemporary artists often no longer
define their practices in terms of specific media,
and artworks frequently are not easily distin-
guished from industrial projects, commercial ad-
vertising, social gatherings, and other aspects of
everyday life. Accordingly, Arthur Danto famously
concludes that art history has come to an end.
1
While some might mistake Danto’s declaration
to be cynical, in fact, it is celebratory. According
to Danto, the modernist pursuit of self-definition
was misguided: the displacement of an essentially
philosophical problem, provoked by a crisis in,
what he takes to be, the conventional role of art to
represent the world. By contrast, he argues that
the exhaustion of this pursuit in the pluralism
of contemporary art made possible the proper,
philosophical formulation of the problem of art’s
definition, and emancipated artists to pursue their
work without concerning themselves with defining
their practices.
Danto’s philosophy of art history serves as a
necessary supplement to his ontology of art, and
stakes a claim within philosophical aesthetics for
best accommodating the seemingly open-ended
diversity of contemporary art. However, because
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(page number not for citation purpose)Danto elevates art’s definition to a point of philo-
sophical principle, and denigrates the aesthetic
properties of artworks to a matter of empty in-
difference, his declaration of the end of art not
only fails to do justice to the lavish formal diversity
of art in recent decades, but also contributes to its
misconstrual: as either the rhetorical vehicle for
pre-conceived notions, or mere entertainment.
Accordingly,thisessayrevisitstheoppositionbe-
tween autonomy and pluralism central to Danto’s
philosophy of art history. Because Danto mis-
construes the problem of self-definition in art as
philosophical*which is to say, as conceptual*
he presupposes autonomy and pluralism to be
antithetical as determinate and indeterminate.
On this basis, he assumes the modernist pursuit
of self-definition to be dogmatic, and juxtaposes
it to the pluralism of contemporary art as, not
only open-ended, but ultimately inconsequential.
However,whenunderstoodasadistinctlyaesthetic
problem, autonomy does not oppose pluralism.
Instead, the two implicate one another. So under-
stood, the pursuit of self-definition in the history of
modern art is not therefore dogmatic, but rather
pluralistic, and the pluralism of contemporary
art marks not an eschatological break with modern
art history, but rather deepens and extends its
fundamental problems, amidst the aesthetics of the
commonplace.
2
THE ILLUSION OF THE END
The end of art is, for Danto, ‘‘the end of a certain
story.’’
3 It is the end of modernism, which he
explains as art’s pursuit of philosophical self-
definition, and in a postmodernist vein, he posi-
tions his theory of contemporary art’s pluralism in
distinction from Clement Greenberg’s now classi-
cal defense of modern art’s autonomy. He writes:
Greenberg and I see self-definition as the
central historical truth of modernist art. But
his narrative differs in every other respect
from mine. He sees self-definition in terms
of purity, and hence the history of Modern-
ism as the pursuit of painting in its purest
possible state: a kind of genre cleansing, as
one might put it, a program easily politicized
as aesthetic Serbianism.
4
In contrast to Greenberg’s modernist defense of
art’s autonomy, Danto describes his own view as
‘‘altogether anti-purist’’ and he explains contem-
porary art as ‘‘objectively pluralistic.’’
5
The struggle for philosophical self-definition
was, for Danto, art’s history. It oriented the
direction of art’s development, and gave stylistic
unity to its distinct epochs. However, according to
Danto, this struggle exhausted itself in the 1960s
with the complication of art and everyday life,
paradigmatically marked for him by the advent
of Pop Art. Because Pop Art was indistinguishable
to the naked eye from everyday objects, Danto
contends, it proved that art could not be defined
aesthetically, and therefore could not be defined
by artists. The burden of art’s definition was
relinquished to philosophy. In fact, he contends,
it was first properly presented to it*to him*as
a matter of what he calls, ‘‘the non-identity of
indiscernibles,’’ in 1964, in the Stable Gallery,
when he first confronted Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box.
Since the appearance of Warhol’s Brillo Box
provides no clear way to distinguish it from com-
monplace objects, Danto argues that what con-
stitutes the piece as a work of art is its situation in
‘‘the art world.’’ As a result, Danto frequently is
credited with contributing to the development of,
what has come to be known as, the institutional
theory of art. However, Danto does not therefore
understand artworks merely sociologically, as
objects sanctioned by the artists, critics, dealers,
and curators, who comprise the art world. To the
contrary, he proffers an essentialist theory of art
as ‘‘semantic vehicles,’’ which are not only part of
the world, but also about it. Artworks, he con-
tends, are distinguished from everyday objects by
an act of ‘‘artistic identification’’ through which
artists designate their works as art and invest them
with meanings. He writes: ‘‘Interpretation is ...
constitutive, for an object is an artwork at all only
in relation to an interpretation.’’
6 And he explains
the art world, accordingly, as the historical matrix
of art theories.
Danto’s philosophy of art history provides a
necessary supplement to his ontology of art by
accounting for, what he takes to be, the develop-
ment of the proper problem of art’s definition,
and by explaining the aesthetic diversity of con-
temporary art*which he calls ‘‘art after the end
of art’’*as evidence of art’s fundamentally con-
ceptual nature.
7 But Danto does not therefore
conclude that the work of contemporary artists
is philosophical. To the contrary he contends
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(page number not for citation purpose)that art has been freed of, what he calls, its
‘‘philosophical disenfranchisement’’ and so now
continues independently from any demand for
self-determination. In the wake of Warhol, he
argues:
Artists no longer needed to be philosophers.
They were liberated, having handed over
the problem of the nature of art to philoso-
phy, to do what they wanted to, and at this
precise historical moment, pluralism became
the objective historical truth.
8
While initially, he despaired of this post-historical
condition as a ‘‘dismal’’ state of ‘‘vanished vitality’’
Danto subsequentlyhas come torelish in it.
9 Freed
from the burden of philosophical self-definition,
he argues, contemporary artists now work in a
‘‘spirit of absolute free play.’’
10 And, rather than
required to stake his claim as a critic, he contends,
‘‘I have no grounds for excluding anything ...I can
like it all.’’
11
In the introduction to their edited collection of
Danto’s essays, philosophers Gregg Horowitz and
Thomas Huhn summarize as follows: ‘‘Art has
been freed of its hidden agendas, ...and so, too,
has criticism been liberated by leaving behind its
hunt for the truth in art ...The space of taste’s
freedom becomes a reiterated space of pure
self-determination, which it remains to critics to
claim.’’
12However, becauseDanto’s ‘‘emancipation’’
of art from philosophy is purchased at the expense
of the value of aesthetic judgment in its estima-
tion, Danto compromises what he purportedly
accomplishes. Rather than liberated from the
strictures of philosophy, the ‘‘space of taste’s
freedom’’ is closed as a condition of Danto’s
ontology of art.
13 ‘‘The age of pluralism is upon
us,’’ writes Danto, ‘‘It does not matter any longer
what you do, which is what pluralism means.’’
14
As a result, Danto’s philosophy of art history
fails to do justice in particular to contemporary
art, which has exhibited a flowering of richly
formalist artwork in the 25 years since he first
drafted his philosophy of art history.
15 Registering
this development, art historian Johanna Drucker
writes:
A renewed studio culture is flourishing.
Making objects with evident appreciation of
process has pushed traditional techniques
into a highly charged exchange with new
media capabilities. Materials and structures
have never been more varied. Nor has the
license to use them ever been so broad.
16
Of course, Danto is not blind to these changes.
To the contrary, they are integral to the shift in
his attitude towards contemporary art. However,
insofar as Danto takes the explosion of new artistic
forms to be symptomatic of art’s liberation from
the purportedly philosophical demand for self-
definition, he only can accommodate the aesthetic
diversity of contemporary artworks, by simulta-
neously denigrating the significance of their parti-
cular aesthetic qualities.
Beyond failing to account properly for the
resurgent formalism of contemporary art, Danto’s
denial of the persistent problem of aesthetic auton-
omy furthermore contributes its misconstrual.
On the one hand, while he maintains that artists
no longer need to be philosophers, by arguing
that artworks are defined by their theoretical
interpretation, Danto reduces them to rhetorical
vehicles for heteronomous concepts, reinforcing
the tendency to treat art as not only as misplaced
philosophy but still more often*in essentially
historicist terms*as pseudo-sociology. He writes:
‘‘We cannot be deeply wrong if we suppose that
the correct interpretation of object-as-artwork is
the one which coincides most closely with the
artist’s own interpretation.’’
17 On the other hand,
since Danto displaces the value and significance
of artworks onto concepts he also reduces the
qualities of their appearance to nothing more than
distraction or sophistry, reinforcing the tendency
to treat art as a poor cousin of the entertainment
industry. At best, he contends, art is reduced to
rhetoric or remains to serve the ‘‘abiding human
needs’’ for ‘‘decoration, self-expression, [and] en-
tertainment.’’
18 What Danto celebrates as the
liberation of art from its philosophical disenfran-
chisement thus amounts rather to its highest
expression, insofar as it requires first affirming
the confusion of art and philosophy as the truth of
art’s history, in order then to ‘‘resolve’’ it*and so
assert their disjunction*by displacing the value
and significance of art onto philosophy.
The failure of Danto’s declaration of ‘‘the end of
art’’ to address the complexities of contemporary
art thus requires revisiting the philosophy of art
history on which it is based. If the distinction
that he draws between the modernist pursuit of
self-definition and the pluralism of contemporary
Philosophy of art history
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otherwise be conceived?
THE PLURALISM OF AUTONOMOUS
AESTHETIC JUDGMENT
As the crux of what he addresses as the antinomy
of taste, Kant observes that the autonomy of aes-
thetic judgments is distinguished by its pluralism.
Judgments of beauty are singular judgments based
upon sensuous experiences that nevertheless lay
claim to universal agreement. Directly opposing
Danto’s equation of modernism’s art for art sake
with the pursuit of philosophical self-definition,
Kant thus distinguishes aesthetic judgments from
both cognitive and moral judgments, on the basis
of their lack of conceptual foundations. Rather
than determinate, he contends, the autonomy of
aesthetic judgments is defined precisely by its
reflexive underdetermination. In its disinterested,
contemplative quality aesthetic judgments do not
entail the same investment in their object as either
cognitive or moral judgments. Instead their nor-
mativity lies in the subjective states they engender.
However, because this subjectivity is*for the
same reason*not rooted in the eccentricities of
merely empirical contingencies, it nevertheless lays
claim to universal assent.
As characteristic of their pluralism, Kant ob-
serves that aesthetic judgments remain rooted in
time, always to be determined again in the sin-
gularity of the sensual encounter, as what he
paradoxically calls, contingently necessary. Accord-
ingly, he notes that aesthetic ideals do not therefore
admit of perfection. While no less binding in the
normativity of the standard they present, aesthetic
ideals do not instantiate general types. To the
contrary, they frequently*perhaps even always*
entail aberrations that defy the expectations of
established standards: Cleopatra’s nose or Kirk
Douglas’ chin, the asymmetry in the smile on the
Mona Lisa, or the touch of yellow that interrupts
the fiery red of a sunset. Despite evoking a nor-
mative ideal, each remains singular in its eccen-
tricity, and so ought not to be confused with a
model of perfection*which, again, implies the
instantiation of a concept*but rather must be
understood as exemplary.
As a potential stumbling block in the logic of
his analysis, Kant notes that, contrary to objects
of natural beauty, artworks are created as realiza-
tions of artistic intentions. Are they not therefore
incarnations of antecedent concepts drawn from
the minds of their creators? Kant argues, no. Were
there some such determining concept in artistic
creation, art would be either merely a matter of
eccentrically subjective, sensual gratification, ex-
plicable by recourse to the cognitive principles of
empirical science, or it would be an objectively
normative moral concern, explicable by recourse
to ethical principles. Accordingly, Kant concludes,
we rather attribute to artists a natural gift, which
drives their creative practices and distinguishes the
ideas that inform their projects from the deter-
minate concepts of the understanding: namely,
genius. And, in his theory of genius, Kant again
postulates the pluralism of the normative stan-
dards in artworks.
Despite the critical judgment undoubtedly en-
tailed in their production, artworks do not realize
pre-conceived generalities, and ought not to be
misunderstood as instantiating mutually exclusive
theories of art. At the same time, however, despite
this lack of conceptual determination, they are not
merely random nonsense. Indeed, Kant contends,
the products of genius ‘‘give the rule to art,’’ but in
and through their sensuous particularities*like he
says of ideal beauties*as exemplars. To slavishly
copy an artist’s work as a model of perfection*
which is, of course, not only common but the
essence of ‘‘academicism’’*would be to compro-
mise, rather than realize the principle of his or
her genius. Instead, Kant contends, genius begets
genius, as an exemplary ideal, which inspires
students to respond in kind, producing singularly
universal works of their own. Rather than dog-
matically exclusive, the rule that genius sets for
art thus inspires the proliferation of other simi-
larly exemplary works: paradoxically mandating
diversity.
Finally, as the decisive point of contrast be-
tween his aesthetic theory and Danto’s philosophy
of art history, Kant explains the normativity of
aesthetic judgments as the pleasurable, ‘‘free
play’’ of the faculties that they engender. While
objects of aesthetic reflection neither satisfy needs,
nor realize moral norms, he contends, they never-
theless exhibit a ‘‘purposeless purposiveness,’’
evidenced by their power to enthrall, and mani-
fested in the form of finality: the sense that
something appears just as it should, expressed in
the proclamation ‘‘that’s beautiful.’’ Registered in
C. Buckner
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Kant, not the empirical qualities of objects them-
selves, but rather the reflexive quickening of one’s
own faculties. Nevertheless, he is careful to note,
in aesthetic reflection, the mind does not simply
wander aimlessly. Instead, the free play of the
faculties entails a sense of harmony*an imagined
order in experience that sustains and stimulates
their play*in spite of the absence of any deter-
mining cognitive or moral concept. Aesthetic
judgments register the enjoyment of one’s very
capacity to find order in experience, to imagine
possible orders. Although it fulfills no determinate
concept, the harmonies of aesthetic form thus
affectively satisfy cognition in general, by present-
ing a sensible order, which instills a sense of won-
der and enlivens one’s engagement with the world.
Whereas Danto juxtaposes aesthetic autonomy,
as dogmatic determination, to aesthetic pluralism,
as an indifferent free play, for Kant, the autonomy
of aesthetic judgments is thus itself defined*
precisely in opposition to the kind of conceptual
determination with which Danto conflates it*
by free play, and the undetermined free play of
the faculties is itself the basis of their normative
definition. But how then is this pluralism of
aesthetic judgments manifested in the history of
modern art’s pursuit of self-definition?
THE PLURALISM OFAUTONOMOUS ART
Danto’s theory of contemporary art rests upon
three intersecting histories of the relationship
between art and ideas in the West. Most broadly
he argues that, since Plato banished poets from his
imagined republic, philosophy has seen art as an
enemy and worked to neutralize its force, either by
‘‘ephemeraliz[ing]’’ it as divorced from reality,
or by ‘‘taking it over’’ as ‘‘doing what philosophy
itself does, only uncouthly.’’
19 For Danto, this
thesis concerns the history of philosophy perhaps
more than the history of art*until the rise of
modernist art, and, what he explains as, the
emergence of the problem of art’s self-definition.
From the Renaissance until the end of the 19th
century, he contends, art history conformed to the
model provided by Giorgio Vasari, and concerned
itself only with the success or failure of artists’
mimetic representations of the world. However,
he argues, with the invention of film, this conven-
tional role for artists was usurped, and the arts
were thrown into uncertainty. Whereas sculptors
and painters could only infer movement, film
could present it directly.
20 Danto writes; ‘‘The
issue was what was painting now to be, and this in
the end could only be answered with a philo-
sophical theory.’’
21 Art suffered an identity crisis,
which compelled it for the first time to address
the problem of its self-definition. In the process,
Danto contends, art was infected with its age-old
enemy, philosophy; and he reads the history of
art after 1880 as a series of attempts to provide
a philosophical answer to the problem of art’s
definition, until the pursuit exhausted itself in
the 1960s, giving rise to the objective pluralism
of contemporary art. When carried to its limit,
Danto contends, the excessive nature of the de-
mand it entailed became clear, and artwork was
purged of its philosophical confusion. The pro-
blem of art’s definition was left to philosophers,
and artists were liberated to pursue their work
without concerning themselves about the defini-
tion of their practices.
The first striking feature about Danto’s specu-
lative art history is his assertion that modern art
remained fundamentally unproblematic from its
inception in the High Middle Ages and Renais-
sance through to the late 19th century, securely
and uniformly defined by the principle of natu-
ralist representation until challenged on those same
terms by the rise of moving-image technologies. In
the formulation of his philosophy of art history,
Danto thus excludes the problem of self-definition
from representational practices themselves, fram-
ing definition instead as a strictly theoretical
problem that properly belongs to another domain
and only secondarily infects art, which he posits
as originally an uncomplicated given. However,
as art historian Arnold Hauser famously argues
in his study of Mannerism, problems concerning
art’s definition emerged concomitantly with the
earliest developments of modern art.
Mannerism presents a crisis in art that para-
doxically results from the extraordinary accom-
plishments of the High Renaissance. In the wake
of Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Raphael, what
were artists to do? The elevation of painting and
sculpture from crafts to liberal arts, and the
correlative appreciation of the artist as an intellec-
tual who contributes to the understanding of the
world, placed a newfound burden on the subse-
quent generation. At the same time, the talents of
Philosophy of art history
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stifle their successors’ creativity. The force of their
accomplishments turned the attention of subse-
quent generations to the study of their art rather
than the careful attention to nature on which it
was based, reducing renaissance naturalism to*
or even revealing it to be*a set of technological
contrivances. At the same time, the remarkable
accomplishments of the Renaissance masters left
little room for novelty, compelling artists to sys-
tematically complicate and even distort the repre-
sentations of figures and space in their works.
In the immediate wake of the High Renaissance,
Mannerist artists such as Parmigianino, Tintoretto,
and Giambolonga thus produced the first self-
consciously non-representational art in the history
of the West*four-and-a-half centuries before the
formal experiments of post-Impressionism.
Beyond their departure from Renaissance con-
ventions, the anti-classical distortions of Manner-
ist art furthermore reflect a deep-seated skepticism
about the very veracity of naturalist represen-
tation. To the contrary, Mannerists evidence a
fascination with art’s capacity to suspend the
apparent objectivity of experience and to supplant
its purported laws with rules of its own. Hauser
writes: ‘‘The age had lost confidence in the
unambiguity of facts, had lost the sense of actuality
altogether.’’
22 What Danto posits as the unproble-
matic definition of art, until challenged by the
development of film, is thus subject to profound
skepticism as soon as it is asserted. Hauser con-
tinues: ‘‘In every mannerist work, the artist seems
to be trying to demonstrate that artistic values do
not have to be, or actually cannot be, simple.’’
23
Radicalizing the problem still further, Mannerist
tendencies already are evident in the work of the
High Renaissance masters. Mannerism’s challenge
to the standard of naturalist representation cannot
be therefore simply dismissed, as symptomatic of
the Renaissance’s decline. Instead, it must be
recognized as an anxious self-criticism intrinsic
to the very project of Renaissance humanism.
Rather than established standards, the principles
of Renaissance art are utopian aspirations whose
value, authority, and ability to sustain themselves
across generations are uncertain from the very
moment of their inception. Instead of instituting a
definition of art that goes unchallenged until the
late 19th century, the naturalism of the Italian
Renaissance thus initiates a problematic struggle
between artists, and within their respective prac-
tice, about the value and aim of their work. This
struggle*as evidenced already in Mannerism and
the complexities of Renaissance art*drives the
development of the diverse artistic styles that
constitutes the history of early modern art.
Other crises requiring artists to reflect on the
value and end of their work can be traced through-
out the history of modern European art.
24 How-
ever, the period of the late 18th and early 19th
centuries most clearly brings to light both how the
problem of self-definition is integral to art rather
than infecting it from without, and how the prob-
lem of art’s autonomy does not oppose but rather
entails aesthetic pluralism. During this period
of profound social change, art finally shed its
moorings in religious ritual and feudal social
conventions. It emerged for the first time fully
in its autonomy as a distinct field of practice,
whose value and significance did not depend upon
external institutions or ideologies and, while this
accomplishment of art’s autonomy might be cele-
brated as a triumph, it simultaneously*and for
the very same reasons*was suffered as a crisis
concerning art’s definition. At this moment, art
historian T.J. Clark writes with particular regard to
Jacques-Louis David’s Death of Marat,
Contingency enters the process of picturing.
It invades it. There is no other substance out
of which paintings can now be made*no
givens, no matters and subject matters, no
forms, no usable pasts. Or none that a
possible public could be taken to agree on
anymore.
25
With the breakdown of the social institutions in
which art previously had been produced and had
found its meaning, artists were saddled with a
still greater burden to define their own projects,
resulting in an explosion of diverse new forms and
contents in art.
In the late 18th century, painting in particular
ceased to be organized as a profession among
others in the feudalguild system. Knowledge ofthe
trade was no longer passed down from masters to
apprentices, who grinded their colors and assisted
them in their practices. Instead, as emblematic of
its newfound modernity, painting was now taught
like philosophy, on the basis of abstract principles
derived from a whole canon of past masters. This
abstraction presented an intrinsic problem con-
cerning the transmission of inherited knowledge,
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on the careful study of classical models provides
a vivid example. But the broader ramifications of
these changes ultimately manifested themselves
in the marketplace. Artists no longer painted for
individual patrons whose express wishes they
knew, or even for the general public whose mood
they could try to gauge. Instead they found them-
selves competing for success in academic exhibi-
tions in which melodrama and spectacle might
easily win out over work that requires more
thoughtful attention. And many artists indeed
rebelled against the standards established by the
academies and their annual exhibitions, resulting
in a general crisis concerning the definition of
art.
26
The most immediate and visible effect of this
newfound autonomy of art, and the crisis it
entailed, was a pluralistic proliferation of novel
subject matters. Previously, paintings primarily
presented religious subjects from the Bible and
lives of the saints. Even secular subjects remained
largely limited to Classical mythology. However,
in the late 18th century, artists began to produce
works depicting anything from Shakespearean
dramas, to recent historical events, to personal
flights of the imagination. Benjamin West’s The
Death of General Wolfe, for instance, famously
scandalized the academy by depicting historical
figures in contemporary dress rather than classical
costumes. In their etchings and prints, artists such
as Francisco de Goya and William Blake depicted
private, fantastic visions, which previously had
been found only in poetry. And John Turner and
John Constable contributed to the elevation of
landscape from its status as above only still life in
the established hierarchy of painting to an art form
rivaling history painting.
Along with this pluralistic diversity of subject
matters in the newly autonomous art of the late
18th and early 19th centuries, the work of the
period also exhibits a heightened uncertainty
about art’s appropriate form and a correlative
proliferation of formal experiments. In his study of
David’s Marat, Clark draws upon Max Weber’s
theory of modernity as marked by ‘‘the disen-
chantment of the world,’’ to argue that the force
of the painting hinges on ‘‘the impossibility of
transcendence and shows us politics as the form
of a world.’’
27 He situates it historically in light of
the cult that developed around Marat after his
death and interprets it as part of the Jacobin
struggle to lay claim to representing the people of
the new French republic. He writes: ‘‘the Jacobins
found themselves negotiating with too many
things*too many interests and energies*calling
themselves Marat.’’
28 What was Marat’s legacy to
mean*and how? If West’s Death of General Wolf
presents a newfound attention to historical details,
Clark contends the need to develop a properly
historical form of representation riddles David’s
Marat with uncertainties about the practice of
painting itself. In this light, the 18th century
transformations in historical painting provide
evidence of artists not only searching for new
subject matters, but also working to develop new
forms of representation appropriate to the modern
world.
29
Finally, rather than exhausting the problem
of self-definition in modern art, the complication
of art and everyday life lies at its very center. Of
course, in the history of modernism, this com-
plication develops along many distinct, even con-
trasting lines, from the socially charged sculptural
installations of the Russian constructivists to the
elaboration of John Cage’s insight into the tem-
porality of musical form in Fluxus’ performance;
and, when reflecting on the precursors to Warhol,
Danto pays particular attention to Dadaism,
whose repudiation of aesthetic conventions ap-
pears to support his own arguments (despite their
categorical differences). However, the complica-
tion of art and everyday life develops equally*
in fact, one might say, essentially*as an integral
component of modernism’s pursuit of aesthetic
autonomy, in the synthetic cubism of Georges
Braque and Pablo Picasso.
In their radicalization of the problem of art’s
autonomy, post-Impressionist artists challenged
the paradigm of painting in particular as a window
onto the world, asserting the work of art instead
as an object in its own right, defined by the terms
of its construction. As commonly understood,
art thus established a new independence, setting
itself off against its surroundings in its radical self-
definition. However, as evident already in Manet’s
use of collage as a compositional tool, rather than
transcending its context, the work of art thus
came to be more profoundly complicated with its
surroundings. As an object of its own, the painting
stands alongside other objects. If the work of art
indeed articulates a point of opposition to its
Philosophy of art history
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And, in the synthetic cubism of Braque and
Picasso, this implication of modernism’s reflexiv-
ity is brought to fruition. As H. H. Arnason
contends, by combining the oil cloth of his 1912
painting Still Life with Chair Caining, with an
actual rope, Picasso ‘‘encourages a reading of the
painted surface itself as a horizontal tabletop,’’ and
complicates the painting with ‘‘the presence of
still-life objects.’’
30 In his collage, Fruit Dish and
Glass, Braque’s use of commercial lettering and
faux-bois paper, similarly plays ‘‘multiple roles,
both literal and descriptive.’’
31 And, in a manner
that anticipates both the dissolution of medium-
specificity, and complication of art and everyday
life*which Danto takes to be definitive of the
distinction between modern and contemporary
art*Picasso’s three-dimensional construction,
Maquette for Guitar, ‘‘closed the breach that
separated painting and sculpture, uniting the
pictorial realm with the space of the external
world.’’
32
If art since the late 18th century is pluralistic in
its autonomy from traditional social and religious
institutions, why then does Danto feel justified in
opposing it so categorically to art since the 1960s?
AUTONOMY AGAINST PLURALISM
As Danto contends, in the history of modern art,
many artists and critics indeed respond dogmati-
cally to the crisis in art’s autonomy, as if the
problem it presents could be resolved once and
for all like an empirical or moral dilemma, and
their art or the art they champion could provide
the final word on art’s definition. For Danto, the
paradigm of this tendency is Clement Greenberg,
who provides him an excellent foil because he
both articulates a strong defense of modern art’s
aesthetic reflexivity and compromises his own for-
malism by elevating it to a determinate principle.
However, Danto is mistaken to take Greenberg’s
dogmatism at face value, to overlook the ambiva-
lence in his critical theory, and to treat his ten-
dency to collapse considerations of aesthetic
form into points of principle as the fundamental
horizon for problems in modern art history.
In ‘‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch,’’ for instance,
Greenberg famously explains modernism as a
response to the problem of art’s definition. He
writes:
A society, as it becomes less and less able, in
the course of its development, to justify the
inevitability of its particular forms, breaks up
the accepted notions upon which artists and
writers must depend in large part for com-
munication with their audiences. It becomes
difficult to assume anything. All the verities
involved by religion, authority, tradition,
style, are thrown into question, and the writer
or artist is no longer able to estimate the
response of his audience to the symbols and
references with which he works.
33
Typically, he contends, such a breakdown of cul-
turalconventionsprovokesareactionarydefenseof
the jeopardized standards*an ‘‘Alexandrianism,’’
which upholds the precedents set by past masters
as determinate and dwindles in creative output as
it limits itself to mere academicism. By contrast,
however, modernism concedes the underdetermi-
nation of aesthetic standards and works to ‘‘find
a path along which it would be possible to keep
culture moving in the midst of ideological confu-
sion and violence.’’
34
Instead of denying the breakdown of accepted
standards, Greenberg contends that modernists
address art’s underdetermination by systemati-
cally reflecting on the conditions of their own
practices. That is, they make this underdetermi-
nation their own, integrating it as the substance of
their work, by critiquing the hackneyed conven-
tions of academic art in order to unearth that
which in it still carries compelling force. In this
way, Greenberg explains modernism as a kind of
‘‘transcendental turn’’ in art, through which artists
come to examine the conditions of the possibility
of their artwork. He writes: ‘‘I identify Modernism
with the intensification, almost exacerbation of
th[e] self critical tendency that began with the
philosopher Kant.’’
35 However, for Greenberg,
modernism’s self-reflection does not*in principle*
take the form of philosophy but rather practical
investigation. ‘‘The essence of modernism,’’ he
continues, ‘‘lies ...in the use of the characteristic
methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline
itself.’’
36 Modernist artworks practically inter-
rupt the illusions they depict*and other con-
ventional effects*by bringing to the fore the
conditions that make them possible. Famously,
Greenberg explains: ‘‘Whereas one tends to see
what is in an Old Master before one sees the
picture itself, one sees a Modernist picture as a
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37 And he defines artistic modernism
as ‘‘the imitation of imitation as process.’’
38
In this vein, Greenberg’s critical theory might
be read as elaborating and further defending
the arguments articulated in Kant’s ‘‘Analytic of
the Beautiful.’’ The modernist painters he cham-
pions resist the reduction of their work’s meaning
to the determination of established conventions.
Instead they recognize and affirm the instability
of these conventions and thematize the formal
conditions of their art as the locus of its meaning.
In their pursuit of self-definition, modernist pain-
ters ought to be understood, accordingly, as
sustaining the ‘‘free play’’ in aesthetic form. But
Greenberg’s appeal to Kant is not well grounded
in his aesthetics. He speaks of Kant almost
metaphorically*as representative of critical re-
flection generally*and, though his writings in-
timate a properly formalist defense of modernist
painting, Greenberg ultimately compromises his
theory by equating aesthetic form with medium-
specificity and so giving it a determinate con-
tent. As Dean Curtin writes: ‘‘Often in reading
Greenberg’s work, one gets the impression that
his analysis of taste owes more to the First
Critique than to the Third.’’
39
For Greenberg modernist reflection on the
conditions of art making specifically concerns
distinguishing and refining the qualities particular
to each of the classical artistic media. ‘‘Each art,’’
he writes, ‘‘had to determine, through its own
operations and works, the effects exclusive to
itself.’’
40 He presupposes that distinct media have
qualities proper to them, and that clarification of
these qualitieswill exhaustthe formalconditions of
the various arts. Greenberg conceives self-criticism
in art as a matter of eliminating from each medium
any effects that better belong to another. Accord-
ingly, he sees the self-definition in modernist
painting as a matter specifically of purging from
painting the three-dimensionality that, he con-
tends, properly belongs to the province of sculp-
ture. And in this regard, as Danto explains, he
indeed treats self-definition as a form of purifica-
tion. While championing aesthetic formalism and,
in principle, resisting the confusion of modern-
ism’s self-consciousness with theory, Greenberg
thus nevertheless provides support for treating
the history of modernist art, as Danto does, as a
series of philosophical answers to the question:
what is art? Most concisely he responds: medium-
specificity. That is, to say, he reformulates the
question in terms of the qualities of distinct media,
asking for example: what is painting? Which he
deems is two-dimensional pictorality. What begins
as a formalist refusal of art’s reduction to de-
terminate contents, in the end, amounts to an
alternative determinate content. Despite articulat-
ing a formalist defense of the underdetermination
of aesthetic judgments, by explaining modernism
as a self-critical reaction against the identification
of art with any specific set of Alexandrian effects,
Greenberg thus formulates an alternative set of
effects, which could not but suffer the same fate of
entrenching itself as dogma and withering to mere
academicism.
As a result of this contradiction in his self-
proclaimed aesthetic formalism, Greenberg thus
remains unable to recognize or appreciate how
artistic movements besides and beyond the Ab-
stract Expressionism he champions*including
specifically Minimalism, Performance, and Pop*
pursue the same self-critical investigation of art’s
formal conditions beyond the limits of medium-
specificity. These movements demonstrate that the
formalconditionsofart’sproductionandreception
can be neither neatly apportioned between distinct
art forms nor exhausted by the materiality of
art objects. As famously registered in art critic
Michael Fried’s denunciation of its theatricality,
Minimalism’s distillation of the art object’s aes-
thetic properties activates the phenomenological
dynamics of the audiences’ movement through the
space of the gallery, and embodied engagement
with the work over time.
41 Performance art simi-
larly brings to the fore art’s corporeal and temporal
dimensions, not simply as a departure from, but
also as a critical exposition of the contemplative
enjoyment of art*anticipated specifically by
Greenberg’s hero, Jackson Pollock, when he lay
his canvases on the ground and began to dance
in and on them while*or rather, as*painting.
And Pop Art specifically challenged the ideo-
logical division between high and low culture*
Greenberg’s own ‘‘avant-garde and kitsch’’*
expanding the visual field available to fine artist to
include the brash aesthetics of consumer culture.
Registering their dissonance with Greenberg’s
misguided dogmatism, these art historical devel-
opments inspire Danto’s declaration of the end of
art history. However, just as Greenberg is mis-
taken to presume that the aesthetic conditions of
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to the determination of medium-specificity, Danto
is mistaken to presume that the problem of art’s
definition is not artistic, but rather philosophical.
42
In the art of the 1960s, not even conceptual art
achieves the degree of theoretical sublima-
tion implied by Danto’s philosophy of art his-
tory. In his ‘‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,’’ Sol
Lewitt explicitly distinguishes conceptual art
from ‘‘mathematics, philosophy, or any other
mental discipline.’’
43 And, even Joseph Kosuth*
who works in an overtly philosophical mode,
drawing upon Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and pro-
ducing artworks that explore propositional re-
sponses to the question: what is art?*does not
realize his apparently theoretical intentions. Ra-
ther than rendering explicit art’s philosophical
foundations, Kosuth enacts, what Peter Osborne
vividly describes as, ‘‘an aestheticization of logical
positivism.’’
44 And, later in his career, Kosuth
himself renounces his philosophical approach to
the problem of art’s definition, conceiving artwork
instead as a form of anthropology, in which the
artist internalizes and works upon established
cultural conventions.
AUTONOMY, PLURALISM, PLAY
When one accordingly suspends Greenberg’s and
Danto’s common confusion of art’s definition with
a determinate judgment*implicitly or explicitly
akin to one based on a cognitive or moral
concept*the complication of art and everyday
life, elaborated by artists of the 1960s and 1970s,
thus presents neither a compromise of the project
of self-definition (reduced to medium-specificity)
nor its exhaustion (understood as a philosophical
problem, misplaced in art). Instead, it presents
the extension of the aesthetic underdetermina-
tion, characteristic of the crisis in modern art, to
everyday experience, as a register of the reciprocal
complication of the two. In a critical analysis of
Rachel Whiteread’s sculptural Water Tower (1998),
which sits atop a Manhattan building, Drucker
makes this point in terms that could be extended
to contemporary artworks in general. She writes:
By making an aesthetic addition to territory,
placing itself in a context in a way that it
cannot help but invoke the diachronic quality
of its meaning as an image/icon, the piece
literally inserts itself within the contemporary
geography that is simultaneously a lived,
material world and one in which an aesthetic
gesture can register.
45
Contemporary art is neither simply aesthetically
opposed to ordinary life nor simply dissolved into
it as aesthetically indifferent. Instead, contem-
porary artists bear the burden of defining their
work amidst the aesthetics of the everyday. In this
regard, rather than exhausted, the problem of art’s
autonomy persists, as directly correlative to the
pluralism of contemporary art’s complication with
the commonplace.
While Danto’s declaration of the end of art
history might appear to be scandalous, to the
contrary, it avoids the critical and creative pro-
blems presented by this complication of art and
everyday life, by abstracting art’s integrity to a
point of philosophical principle. The apparent
cynicism of Danto’s philosophy of art history is
only the necessary compliment to his idealistic,
ontological guarantee of art’s inherent value. At
the same time, while defending the persistent
relevance of aesthetic judgment to contemporary
art might appear to be reactionary, to the contrary,
it holds open the difficulties presented by art’s
complication with everyday life, by refusing any
ontological guarantee of the value of artworks,
as categorically distinct for everyday objects.
Insofar as they draw upon, and so remain integrally
embroiled with, the aesthetics of extra-artistic
phenomena, the significance of artworks remains
fundamentally contingent, always to be articulated
again by artists and critics alike in the concrete
particularities of discrete works.
At the same time, while refusing the declaration
of its end, defending the persistent importance of
aesthetic judgment to contemporary art retro-
actively complicates art history itself, by calling
for consideration of art’s relationship to, what in
fact has emerged as, the broader field of ‘‘visual
culture.’’ Art’s development as an autonomous
field does not depend upon its categorical distinc-
tion from other pursuits. Instead, it registers the
fact that considerations of aesthetic form have
been rendered fundamentally problematic. If ar-
tistic practices are thus irreducible to religious,
and other social conventions, they are not there-
fore altogether divorced from them. Instead, the
internal complexities that define art as a field
reflect the complexities of its relationship to other
fields of thought and practice, and if artists and
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even denied*this complication, contemporary
art has rendered it unavoidable.
While the history of modern art does not
therefore present a uniform narrative of suc-
cessively supplanting styles, contemporary art
does not, in fact, present an open-ended field of
possibilities. Of course, Danto’s contention is
incontrovertible, that now, in principle, anything
is possible. However, as this essay has aimed to
reinforce, art history is not defined by principles,
but rather by artistic practices. In the decades
since Danto first formulated his philosophy, art
has thus developed along concrete lines, defined,
among other ways, by the very specific strategies
that artists, like Whiteread, have adopted to
engage and draw upon the aesthetics of everyday
life. Regardless of principles, the field of contem-
porary art thus remains very precisely delimited
by the accomplishments, and failures of these
generations; and the question concerning how art
history subsequently will develop, through the
work of artists working in their wake, still remains
to be seen.
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